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Abstract—This work investigates the possibility of using
non-orthogonal multi-carrier waveforms to defend against
eavesdropping attacks. The sophisticated detection required for
non-orthogonal signals provides a natural defence mechanism
in secure communications. However, brute-force tactics such as
maximum likelihood detection would break the defence by at-
tempting all possible solutions. Thus, a waveform scaling strat-
egy is proposed to scale up the number of non-orthogonally
packed sub-carriers, which complicates signal detections and
prevents eavesdropping. In addition, a waveform tuning strat-
egy is proposed to intentionally tune waveform parameters
to enhance feature similarity. Therefore, eavesdroppers would
be confused to misidentify signals resulting in subsequent
detection failures.
Index Terms—Security, encryption, waveform, non-
orthogonal, physical layer, eavesdropping, deep learning,
interception, defence, sphere decoding.
I. INTRODUCTION
The open nature of wireless environment makes radio
communications vulnerable [1] to eavesdropping data in-
terception [2]. Defence strategies [3], such as millimetre
wave, beamforming, artificial noise, security coding and
directional modulation are proposed to mitigate the eaves-
dropping. Existing defence solutions are more likely de-
pendent on surrounding channel environment and therefore
are not robust in time-variant multipath fading channels
when channel state information (CSI) is imperfectly known
[4]. Traditional theoretical research prefers assuming per-
fect CSI or some other ideal assumptions, which makes
theoretically achieved discoveries unrealistic in practical
field experiment tests. Secure multiple user access is hardly
implementable when legitimate users and eavesdroppers are
close in space [2], which is limited by imperfect beam-
forming leakages. In addition, the typical non-orthogonal
multiple access (NOMA) based solution [5] has risks of
information leakages since one user is allowed to decode
signals from other users. Traditional ways to extend secure
communication coverage would rely on error correction
coding [6] while its power and throughput efficiency is
limited. Artificial noise enabled security is treated as an
efficient defence solution [7]. However, extra power would
be wasted to generate noise and security reliability is
compromised. Data encryption [8], widely used at link
or transport layers, is also applicable to enhance physical
layer security. However, its applications are limited and
unrealistic in low-cost consumer-level products. Moreover,
encrypted data could be captured by eavesdroppers and
processed offline using brute-force tactics. Therefore, ad-
vanced defence countermeasures are needed to replace or
complement traditional channel dependent physical layer
security solutions.
With the development of artificial intelligence, machine
learning/deep learning based adversarial attacks [9], [10]
become more destructive than typical eavesdropping at-
tacks. As defined in [10], adversarial attacks are divided
into white-box attack and black-box attack. The white-box
attack indicates that the adversary has perfect knowledge
of the signal formats while the black-box attack assumes
no knowledge about the signal formats. Practically, the
signal format knowledge is not known by an adversary.
Therefore, learning signal features will be the first step
in the black-box attack. Work in [11] explains three main
types of attack termed inference attack, evasion attack and
causative attack. A defence strategy is proposed in [9] where
a legitimate user can use fake labels to fool an adversary
attacker. In this case, the attacker cannot intelligently train a
reliable signal classifier at the inference attack stage. This is
equivalent to a causative attack from a legitimate user to the
attacker by falsifying the attacker’s training data. However,
the throughput would be reduced because of the fake labels
transmission. Therefore, maintaining a balanced throughput
and security quality is a challenge to be solved.
A non-orthogonal waveform spectrally efficient frequency
division multiplexing (SEFDM), unlikely to be identified
by eavesdroppers, is crafted for enhancing physical layer
security. The research of the non-orthogonal waveform is
traced back to 2003 [12]. Unlike the multicarrier orthogonal
frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) signal, SEFDM
packs sub-carriers closer by violating the orthogonality
leading to either bandwidth saving or data rate increase
advantages. Better than the non-built-in security OFDM, the
non-orthogonally packed sub-carriers in SEFDM bring inter
carrier interference (ICI), which complicates signal detec-
tions but in turn contributes to secure communications since
computationally complex signal detectors would increase
the cost of eavesdroppers to detect signals. Previous work in
[13] studied the possibility of a similar strategy in physical
layer security. The main idea is to overlap two orthogonal
OFDM signals. In this case, interference is introduced
between two overlapped OFDM signals and eavesdroppers
cannot intercept signals without advanced signal detectors.
This might be true when computational complexity is the
primary concern. However, with the advancement in hard-
ware, brute-force but optimal performance achievable de-
tectors become realistic in consumer-level hardware. Thus,
the traditional waveform encryption in [13] is easily broken
down and a solution, which can efficiently combat with
time-variant multipath fading, multiple user access, deep
learning adversarial attack, brute-force offline interception
and beamforming leakage for low-cost hardware working in
a wide communication range, is in urgent need.
This work will investigate two waveform dependent de-
fence methods. Firstly, a waveform scaling strategy aim-
ing to increase the number of non-orthogonally packed
sub-carriers, can significantly increase the computational
complexity of signal detections but in turn prevent eaves-
dropping and enhance information confidentiality. Secondly,
a waveform tuning strategy, related to a waveform band-
width compression factor adjustment, is proposed to confuse
eavesdroppers by misidentifying signals. Deep learning has
seen great success in various applications and is believed to
be a potential approach to assist eavesdropping. Therefore, a
deep learning based eavesdropping attack model is trained to
evaluate the robustness of the proposed defence waveforms.
Results indicate that by intentionally tuning waveform pa-
rameters (i.e. bandwidth compression factor), signal features
cannot be correctly identified by eavesdroppers, which re-
sults in subsequent eavesdropping detection failures.
II. DEFENCE STRATEGY
A. Defence Waveform
The proposed defence waveform has self-created ICI,
which is the essential mechanism of preventing eavesdrop-
pers to accurately identify or detect signals. The principle
of the waveform is expressed as
Xk =
1√
N
N−1∑
n=0
sn exp
(
j2pinkα
N
)
, (1)
where sn indicates the n
th single-carrier symbol within
one SEFDM symbol, N is the number of sub-carriers, k
denotes time sample index and α = ∆f ·T is the bandwidth
compression factor where T is the time period of one
SEFDM symbol and ∆f ≤ 1/T is the sub-carrier spacing.
The power of one SEFDM symbol is computed in the
following
|Xk|2 = 1
N
N−1∑
n=0
N−1∑
m=0
sns
∗
m exp
(
j2pi(n−m)kα
N
)
=
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
|sn|2+
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
N−1∑
m 6=n,m=0
sns
∗
m exp
(
j2pi(n−m)kα
N
)
.
(2)
The self-created ICI within the SEFDM waveform com-
plicates signal detections and therefore increases the cost
of eavesdropping. To separate the constructive signal from
its self-created destructive interference, variables m and
n are introduced in (2). The signal part is defined when
m = n while the interference part is the term when m 6= n.
It should be noted that the value of α determines the
interference term, which is zero when α = 1 (i.e. OFDM)
while non-zero when α 6= 1 (i.e. SEFDM). An illustration
of the non-orthogonal sub-carrier overlapping interference
is shown in Fig. 1, where it clearly shows the ICI at each
sub-carrier location in SEFDM signals.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of self-created inter carrier interference within
SEFDM signals. (a) OFDM sub-carrier packing. (b) SEFDM sub-
carrier packing.
The generation of SEFDM signals is simply performed
via IFFT. To remove the parameter α in (1), a new parameter
M = N/α is defined. By paddingM−N zeros at the end of
each input vector (i.e. a vector consists of N single-carrier
symbols), a new vector of input symbols is obtained as
s
′
i =
{
si 0≤i < N
0 N≤i < M , (3)
where the value of N/α has to be an integer and simulta-
neously a power of two, N/α ∈ 2(N>0), which allows the
IDFT to be implemented by the computationally efficient
radix-2 IFFT. The SEFDM signal in a new format is defined
as
X
′
k =
1√
M
M−1∑
n=0
s
′
n exp
(
j2pink
M
)
, (4)
where n, k = [0, 1, ...,M−1]. The output is cut with onlyN
samples reserved and the restM−N samples are discarded.
Due to the discard of the last M − N samples, ICI is
therefore introduced and is treated as a new enhancement
solution for physical layer security.
B. Waveform Scaling Defence
This section will firstly evaluate the defence methodology
proposed in [13], which expects significant performance
degradation without using a complex signal detector. An
eavesdropper therefore would not extract confidential in-
formation from the non-orthogonal signals. The detection
of traditional OFDM signals depends on the matched filter
(MF), which is essentially an FFT operation at the receiver.
The complexity of FFT is acceptable in widely used com-
munication systems, which requires (N/2)log2(N) multi-
plications and Nlog2(N) additions. For the proposed non-
orthogonal signal, the detection relies on the brute-force
maximum likelihood (ML) detector, which has exponen-
tially increased computational complexity.
In practice, a performance maintained but simpler sphere
decoding (SD) detector is used instead of ML due to the
reduced signal processing complexity by searching for a
partial number of solutions. In this case, SD is faster than
ML. However, the complexity of SD is random since the
search for an optimal solution is related to noise power.
Therefore, to get a fair and convincing comparison, the
upper bound complexity is considered leading to the search
for all possible solutions, which is the case when noise
power dominates. In this case, the complexity is fixed and
is only related to the number of sub-carriers. This section
computes complexity in real-valued operations and only
considers the complexity for one OFDM/SEFDM symbol.
The computations of multiplication and addition operations
are mathematically defined as
C
SD
= (
2N∑
n=1
2n[2n+ 1]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
multiplication
) + (
2N∑
n=1
2n[2n− 1]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
addition
). (5)
With the breakthrough of low-cost hardware, a complex
but powerful detector is no longer a barrier for eavesdrop-
pers to intercept small size signals such as a signal with
N=12 sub-carriers, which is the size of one resource block
in 5G-NR [14]. Therefore, a straightforward solution to
prevent the interception is to make the signal detection
harder by scaling up the size of the non-orthogonal signal.
The complexity of SD is random but it is proportional
to the number of sub-carriers. A higher number of sub-
carriers can enhance signal encryption by complicating
signal detections. Numerical comparisons are presented in
Fig. 2 where only multiplication is considered since its
complexity is more concerned in practical systems. For
the purpose of illustrations, the number of operations in
Fig. 2 is expressed by a logarithmic scale. Therefore, it
is clearly shown that the FFT operation maintains at a
low complexity level while the SD complexity increases
exponentially. A signal with N=256 sub-carriers has an
upper bound complexity of 2256 as shown in Fig. 2. Such
a large number of mathematical operations would take a
significant processing time for the SD detector, which is
unrealistic in consumer-level hardware. Thus, the waveform
scaling will increase the cost of eavesdroppers to intercept
the signals and therefore ensures information confidentiality.
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Fig. 2. The upper bound number (logarithmic) of multiplication
operations versus the number of sub-carriers for SEFDM detector
(i.e. SD) and OFDM detector (i.e. FFT).
16 32 64 128 256
Number of Sub-carriers (N)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
N
um
be
r o
f O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 (L
ine
ar)
1012
Upper-bound: MultiSD
FFT
1632 64 128 256
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1632 64 128 256
0
5
10 10
12
Fig. 3. The upper bound number (linear) of multiplication opera-
tions versus the number of sub-carriers for SEFDM detector (i.e.
MultiSD) and OFDM detector (i.e. FFT).
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Fig. 4. The upper bound number (logarithmic) of multiplication
operations versus the number of sub-carriers for SEFDM detectors
(i.e. SD and MultiSD) and OFDM detector (i.e. FFT).
Waveform scaling is an efficient encryption method to
prevent eavesdropping but it also prevents communications
between legitimate users. To deal with the detection of such
a large size signal, a specially crafted MultiSD detector
was proposed in [15], which can recover large size non-
orthogonal signals with linear computational complexity as
shown in Fig. 3. The newly designed detector still has
higher computational complexity than FFT. However, its
multiple-SD architecture enables parallel processing, which
is applicable in consumer-level hardware. Its complexity is
mathematically expressed as
C
M−SD
=
N
NB
(
2NB∑
n=1
2n[2n+ 1]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
multiplication
) +
N
NB
(
2NB∑
n=1
2n[2n− 1]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
addition
). (6)
In Fig. 4, it clearly shows that the complexity of MultiSD
is significantly reduced relative to the traditional SD detector
considering the same signal scale. This discovery however
endangers the waveform scaling defence since eavesdrop-
pers can intercept signals using the MultiSD detector as
well. Therefore, a more clever and robust defence method
is needed to cope with the eavesdropping signal detection.
C. Waveform Tuning Defence
In practice, an eavesdropper has to learn a signal clas-
sifier, which can identify different signal formats before
any intentional attacks. Existing defence actions for such
artificial intelligence (AI) dependent eavesdropping would
falsify data or labels to prevent accurate classifier training.
Without accurate signal identifications, eavesdroppers can-
not effectively carry out subsequent attacks. However, these
traditional defence mechanisms rely on additional transmis-
sions of fake data and labels, which reduces data throughput
between legitimate users. An efficient approach to address
the potential detection attack is to design a waveform tuning
defence method, which can mislead eavesdroppers into mis-
classifying the format of signals. The wrong classification of
signal formats would result in subsequent detection errors.
This solution is to prevent the potential interception from
eavesdroppers when the MultiSD detector is known.
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Fig. 5. Signal feature diversity and similarity visualization by
modulating the same QPSK data. (a) Type-I signals. (b) Type-II
signals. Values in the bracket indicate the bandwidth compression
factor α.
The principle of waveform tuning defence is shown in
Fig. 5. It is clearly seen that by tuning the bandwidth
compression factors, signal waveforms would have trade-off
between diversity and similarity. Type-I shows apparent sig-
nal diversity since adjacent signals have evident differences
while Type-II shows increased signal similarity because
adjacent signals have close features. We would expect that
the second type of signals are more difficult to separate from
each other than the first type of signals. The same QPSK
data is modulated on all the waveforms in Fig. 5 merely
for signal feature diversity and similarity visualization. For
realistic training and testing in the following sections, we
would use random QPSK data for each signal waveform.
This work assumes that an eavesdropper would automati-
cally learn the features of signals. Therefore, manual feature
extractions are not taken into account in this work.
III. EAVESDROPPING MODEL
It is assumed that an eavesdropper can train an AI signal
classifier, which will be used for automatic signal format
identification. There is no standardized training methodol-
ogy for signal classification. Therefore, we apply the deep
learning convolutional neural network (CNN) model for the
eavesdropping signal classifier. The CNN architecture [16]
is illustrated in Fig. 6 where seven neural network (NN)
layers are designed for signal feature extraction. The first
six NN layers have the same structure while the last NN
layer employs Average Pool instead of Max Pool. For signal
classification, the CNN model uses a full connection and a
SoftMax activation function.
Fig. 6. CNN classifier neural network layer architecture.
Table I: Signal and channel/hardware specifications
Parameter Specification
Sampling frequency (kHz) 200
IFFT sample length 2048
Oversampling factor 8
No. of data sub-carriers 256
Bandwidth compression factor α 1,0.95,0.9,0.85,0.8,0.75,0.7
Modulation scheme QPSK
RF center frequency (MHz) 900
Path delay (s) [0 9e-6 1.7e-5]
Path relative power (dB) [0 -2 -10]
Maximum Doppler frequency (Hz) 4
K-factor 4
Frequency offset (PPM) 2
Omni-directional antenna gain (dBi) 2
Unlike the single-band signal generation in [16], this
work applies the multi-band signal architecture [15], which
can confuse eavesdropping signal identification while make
legitimate user signal detection possible. The signal for each
class (i.e. each α) is generated according to Table I. Since
over-the-air signals would experience a variety of wireless
environments, therefore the signal dataset can be enlarged
similar to [16] via data augmentation passing through the
time-variant channel models in Table I. Training is operated
offline in a computer equipped with an Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Silver 4114 CPU (2 processors). Two eavesdropping classi-
fiers, CNN-1 and CNN-2, are trained using the Type-I and
Type-II data respectively, which are both distorted by the
channel/hardware impairments at a fixed Es/N0=20 dB. A
number of 2000 frames (i.e. OFDM/SEFDM symbols) per
signal class are generated after the channel/hardware data
augmentation. Therefore, there are overall 8000 training
frames for the CNN-1. The amount would increase to 14000
training frames for the CNN-2.
IV. DEFENCE IMPACT
The original waveform encryption proposal [13] is firstly
evaluated in Fig. 7(a), in which it assumes that the optimal
but complex SD detector is technically challenging for
eavesdroppers. Therefore, only simple detectors such as
MF is applicable. It is clearly seen that the non-orthogonal
signal, modulated by 12 sub-carriers, is perfectly recov-
ered by legitimate users using the SD detector while it
is undetectable by an eavesdropper using MF. However,
the risk of knowing and applying SD detection for eaves-
dropping still exists since the rapid advances of hardware
making SD detection possible in consumer-level hardware.
A straightforward solution is to make detection harder by
enlarging the signal size. The performance in Fig. 7(b)
shows the waveform scaling defence impact on a signal
of N=256 sub-carriers. The detection of such a signal
using SD is impossible since the computational complexity
increases exponentially to the upper bound complexity of
2256. Therefore, it can efficiently prevent eavesdropping.
However, it will prevent communications between legitimate
users since SD for such a large size signal is not possible
for them either.
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Fig. 7. Defence impact of waveform scaling.
The proposed waveform tuning can simultaneously deal
with eavesdropping encryption and legitimate user signal
recovery. Its performance is shown in Fig. 8. The target
signal waveform is defined by α=0.8 while eavesdrop-
pers have no knowledge of signal formats in advance. It
clearly shows that the use of incorrect signal detectors (e.g.
α=0.9, 0.85, 0.75, 0.7) results in great BER performance
degradation. It should be noted that the error floors exist
for eavesdroppers with or without knowing the MultiSD
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Fig. 8. Defence impact of waveform tuning.
detector. Only the target legitimate user who knows exact
signal formats is able to apply the correct detector (i.e.
α=0.8) to recover the signal. Thus, the waveform tuning
method fundamentally prevents unauthorized interception
even the MultiSD detector is leaked to eavesdroppers.
0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Tr
ue
 C
la
ss
(a) CNN-1
2
1
800
800
798
799
0.2%
0.1%
100.0%
100.0%
99.8%
99.9%
0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
Predicted Class
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Tr
ue
 C
la
ss
(b) CNN-2
283
252
57
517
548
281
43
250
393
206
142
6
219
1
2
38
429
58
3
370
762
740
35.4%
68.5%
31.3%
17.8%
53.6%
64.6%
31.5%
68.7%
82.3%
4.7%
46.4%
7.5%
95.3%
92.5%
Fig. 9. Confusion matrix visualization for (a) Type-I and (b) Type-
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A realistic waveform tuning impact is shown in Fig. 9
where confusion matrices, in a similar representation to that
of [17], are illustrated for signal classification accuracy.
In each sub-figure, classes indicate the bandwidth com-
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Fig. 10. Defence impact on eavesdropping BER performance for
the target waveform α=0.8 at Es/N0=20 dB.
pression factors α, vertical labels indicate true transmitted
signal classes and horizontal labels indicate predicted sig-
nal classes. Perfect signal classification would show only
diagonal elements in each confusion matrix. Therefore,
it is visually concluded that Type-I signals yield higher
classification accuracy than Type-II signals. The Type-I
signal, with less feature similarity, is nearly 100% accuracy
identified by the CNN-1 classifier. By tuning the waveform
parameter α to enhance feature similarity, only 56.3% of
Type-II signals are classified into correct signal class.
The misclassification of signal formats, as revealed in
Fig. 9, would result in significant eavesdropping BER
performance degradation as shown in Fig. 10. The BER is
zero for traditional OFDM and the MultiSD detected Type-I
signal. The Type-I signal has minor BER degradation when
MF is used. However, the performance of Type-II signal
greatly deteriorates whether or not the MultiSD is known.
This effectively proves the robustness of the non-orthogonal
waveform and its tailored waveform defence strategies in
secure communications.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the capability of using non-
orthogonal waveforms to defend against eavesdropping.
Existing proposals on non-orthogonal waveforms rely on
the assumption that an eavesdropper cannot intercept signals
without complex detectors. However, with the advancement
of hardware, the complexity of brute-force signal detection
is no longer a barrier. Therefore, a waveform scaling defence
strategy is proposed to intentionally further complicate sig-
nal detections by scaling up the signal size. The processing
complexity increases exponentially and would go up to a
level of 2256. The interception for such signals is impossible
to eavesdroppers. However, it also prevents communica-
tions between legitimate users since data recovery is also
challenging for them. A performance-complexity optimized
detector is crafted to deal with large scale non-orthogonal
signal detections. However, this endangers secure communi-
cations since eavesdroppers can get access to the advanced
detector as well. Therefore, a waveform tuning defence
strategy is proposed to cope with the aforementioned issue
by intentionally tuning waveform parameters. In this case,
signals would be tuned to have high feature similarity
and eavesdroppers cannot easily identify them. Confusion
matrices show that the classification accuracy for diversity
dominant signals can approach 100% while it reduces to
56.3% when similarity dominates. The low classification
accuracy would cause the failure of subsequent signal
detections. BER performance reveals the robustness of the
waveform tuning strategy, where the misclassification of
signals results in detection error floors when the advanced
detector is either known or not.
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